On Why the City of Pigs and Clocks Are Not Just

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ABSTRACT Some Plato scholars have recently argued that the "City of Pigs"—described in Book II of the *Republic*, before Socrates goes on to describe Kallipolis and the definition of justice—is better and more just than Kallipolis itself. I argue that this interpretation misconstrues Plato's conception of justice by ignoring three significant conditions that he establishes for making an entity eligible for being just. In overlooking these conditions, scholars have misconceived the definition of justice itself, resulting in an overestimation of the virtue of the City of Pigs.

KEYWORDS Plato, *Republic*, justice, City of Pigs, ideal city, Kallipolis, principle of specialization, form, image, imitation, education, moral psychology

1. INTRODUCTION

THE STANDARD READING OF PLATO'S *Republic* is that justice is predicated of the ideal city and of the philosophers, and that all other constitutions, both psychic and political, that are mentioned in the course of the dialogue are in some way or another defective and unjust. A non-standard reading appears to be gaining traction, however. Unorthodox Plato commentators such as Silverman, Jonas, Nakazawa, Braun, and Rowe argue that the ideal city—lovingly named 'Kallipolis'—is *not* just, that it is merely an improvement upon, but not a complete cure for, the Luxurious City that is described just before it.[1] If we want to gaze upon a just city, these unorthodox commentators propose, look no farther than the City of Pigs. That small *polis*, also called the 'First City' by scholars for its order in Plato's descriptions of the different *poleis*, is distinguished for its moderate consumption and its spirit of cooperation. It is a place where each citizen does their own work and where all work contributes positively to the sustenance of the community. The unorthodox are quick to point out that Socrates himself says that this city is the "true" city and the "healthy" city.[2] These are points to which I must return.

[1]Allan Silverman, "Ascent and Descent"; Mark Jonas, Yoshiaki Nakazawa, and James Braun, "Appetite, Reason, and Education"; and Christopher Rowe, "Key Passage."

[2]*Republic* 372e.

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This paper defends the standard reading. Though the unorthodox commentators are surely correct in their charge that we need to account for the role of the First City in the overall argument of the *Republic*, their judgment that its role is in demonstrating the true Form of Justice creates more problems than it solves. Specifically, it presents problems for how we understand Plato's discussion of justice in the Book IV passages that draw out the city-soul analogy. If it turns out that the First City is the just city, then several of the things that are said about the justice of individuals and cities are rendered inert in the overall account of the dialogue. The aim of this paper is to bring those features of the Book IV discussion into full view and defend them as indispensable to Plato's account of justice. In consequence, I will argue that the First City cannot be just—and certainly not better than Kallipolis—because it is unable to realize those features.

In section 2, I begin by briefly presenting Socrates's characterization of the First City and a summary of what scholars have said about it. My primary concern, however, is to engage with the conception of justice that is offered by the champions of the First City—namely, the unorthodox commentators—in order to think more carefully about the account of justice that animates the entire dialogue. Accordingly, I move quickly from the overview of existing literature to section 3, where I register the various aspects of the Book IV discussion that appear to be unsettled by the unorthodox reading of the First City. There, I build an account for each of three conditions that Plato suggests must be in place in order for a subject to be the kind of thing that may be called 'just' or 'unjust.' These conditions describe the composition of the subject, and Plato presents them as absolute pre-requisites for eligibility for bearing the predicate 'justice.' In exploring these conditions, we will see justice in a new light. We will also see that the First City is compositionally ineligible for being just.

In the final section of the paper, I return to the question of how we account for the role of the First City in the overall argument of the *Republic*. Having argued that it is not a just city, the onus is mine to explain why Socrates has said that the First City is "true" and "healthy." My reading focuses on Socrates's suggestion that we can discern the origins of justice and injustice in the First City. Though Socrates never explains what he means by this claim, I argue that he means that the Principle of Specialization—which is exhibited in that city—is an important element of justice. The issue is that justice consists in more than the Principle of Specialization alone: it requires that the principle be realized in conjunction with the three conditions I discuss in section 3. Because the First City does not—indeed, *cannot*—meet the eligibility requirements established by those three conditions, it manages to instantiate the Principle of Specialization while nevertheless failing to participate fully in the Form of Justice. Hence, in the First City, we can discern "a sort of image of justice" (εἴδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης), as Socrates calls the principle in Book IV.[3] But we must take care lest we mistake this likeness for the thing itself.[4]

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[3] *Republic* 443c. Translations of the *Republic* are from G. M. A. Grube, revised by C. D. C. Reeve, as printed in John Cooper, *Plato: Complete Works*, with some modifications of my own, where noted, based on John Burnet, *Platonis Opera*.

[4] Socrates warns us that such a conceptual error is like living one's life in a dreaming state, in which what is real is mistaken for what is not real. The error consists in believing that "a likeness is not a likeness but rather the thing itself that it is like" (*Republic* 476c).

2. THE CITY OF PIGS AND THE COMMENTARY TRADITION

In Book II of the *Republic*, just following his explanation for why we need to look for justice writ large in a city before we look for it in individual souls, Socrates introduces what has come to be known alternatingly as the 'First City' or the 'City of Pigs.' The city is founded when a handful of citizens divvy-up the work of producing necessary consumer goods:

> I think a city comes to be because none of us is self-sufficient, but we all need many things. Do you think that a city is founded on any other principle?
>
> No.
>
> And because people need many things, and because one person calls on a second out of one need and on a third out a different need, many people gather in a single place to live together as partners and helpers. And such a settlement is called a city. Isn't that so? . . .
>
> So the essential minimum for a city is four or five men?
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> Clearly.
>
> And what about this? Must each of them contribute his own work for the common use of all? For example, will a farmer provide food for everyone, spending quadruple the time and labor to provide food to be shared by them all? Or will he not bother about that, producing one quarter the food in one quarter the time, and spending the other three quarters, one in building a house, one in the production of clothes, and one in making shoes, not troubling to associate with the others, but minding his own business on his own?
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> Perhaps, Socrates, Adeimantus replied, the way you suggested first would be easier than the other.[5]

Socrates modifies this basic model of a society organized according to the division of labor by adding a foreign trade dimension—"it's almost impossible to establish a city in a place where nothing has to be imported"—and a marketplace where the citizens may exchange their products—"we'll need a marketplace and a currency for such exchange."[6] Citizens specialize in the work that the market demands. Skilled sailors emerge, a merchant class is formed, retailers perch in the stalls at market, and a wage-earning group performs the labor-intensive tasks of the city, all according to the economic growth of the *polis*. After establishing this specialization in the workforce as the distinguishing feature of the city, Socrates and Adeimantus agree that it has "grown to completeness."[7]

In all, the city is defined, at least organizationally, by its economic transactions, but Socrates comments on the lifestyle of the city, too:

> Let's see what sort of life our citizens will lead when they've been provided for in the way we have been describing. They'll produce bread, wine, clothes, and shoes,

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[5] *Republic* 369b–370a.

[6] *Republic* 370e and 371b.

[7] *Republic* 371e. For an examination of the organizational principle in the First City and its implications for the political participation of the citizens as well as their education into their specification occupations, see Susan Sauvé Meyer, "Class Assignment."

> won't they? They'll build houses, work naked and barefoot in the summer, and wear adequate clothing and shoes in the winter. For food, they'll knead and cook the flour and meal they've made from wheat and barley. They'll put their honest cakes and loaves on reeds or clean leaves, and, reclining on beds strewn with yew and myrtle, they'll feast with their children, drink their wine, and, crowned with wreaths, hymn the gods. They'll enjoy sex with one another but bear no more children than their resources allow, lest they fall into either poverty or war.[8]

The lifestyle described here is one that follows directly upon the economic set-up of the city. Citizens in this *polis* enjoy moderate pleasures because they are locked in a harmonious and mutually advantageous arrangement vis-à-vis the production of goods that suit their tastes. We might wonder whether the citizens have moderate tastes because of their socio-economic organization, or if the explanation goes the other way around and they have their socio-economic organization because they have moderate tastes. But it is a question for another day. Precisely after Socrates has described this "way of life," Glaucon interjects:

> It seems, Glaucon interrupted, that you make your people feast without any delicacies.
>
> True enough, I replied, I forgot that they'll obviously need salt, olives, cheese, boiled roots, and vegetables of the sort they cook in the country. We'll give them desserts, too, of course, consisting of figs, chickpeas, and beans, and they'll roast myrtle and acorns before the fire, drinking moderately. And so they'll live in peace and good health, and when they die at a ripe old age, they'll bequeath a similar life to their children.
>
> If you were founding a city for pigs, Socrates, he replied, wouldn't you fatten *them* on the same diet?[9]

It is only at this point in the establishment of the city—at the point when it is rejected by Glaucon as inadequate—that it bears the name 'City of Pigs.' The moniker is conferred by Glaucon, the critic, not by Socrates, who appears to be quite content with how his city is set up. It is for this reason that some scholars have chosen to call this *polis* the 'First City,' a nod to its place in the order of Socrates's discussion of city-states as well as a means of avoiding endorsement of Glaucon's negative judgment.

Indeed, we should hesitate to adopt Glaucon's perspective regarding this city. Socrates does acquiesce to his interlocutor's request that richer luxuries be added to the city in order to make it into a city fit for humans rather than swine. Sofas for dining and assortments of sauces and cakes and entertainments are conceded. But Socrates's concession of these luxuries, though granted without dispute, is nevertheless qualified: "The true city, in my opinion, is the one which we've described, the healthy one, as it were. But let's study a city with a fever, if that's what you want. There's nothing to stop us."[10] Socrates goes on to say only a few lines later that "the healthy state is no longer adequate."[11] It is quite clear that Socrates has found something to love—or *founded* something to love—in his "complete," "true," and "healthy" First City.

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[8] *Republic* 372a–c.
[9] *Republic* 372c–d.
[10] *Republic* 372e.
[11] *Republic* 373a.

Herein lies the problem. As many commentators have noted, it is difficult to square Socrates's praise of the First City with his quick acquiescence to Glaucon's criticism. Rachel Barney asks, "Why does Socrates acquiesce in Glaucon's objection? If the First city *is* true and healthy, and embodies the principle of specialization in which justice will turn out to consist, how exactly is it insufficient?"[12] Christopher Rowe reiterates the question, "If this city was always intended simply to disappear from the scene in favour of Callipolis, why would Plato have Socrates praise it to the skies, in the way that he does?"[13] Indeed, there is some tension in Socrates's bold but undefended enthusiasm. He exposes his belief that he has found something genuinely valuable, but he just as quickly declines to champion that good.

Scholars are divided in how they engage with this passage. In one corner are those who focus on the acquiescence first, emphasizing the quickness of Socrates's concession and his willingness to engorge his First City with all the luxuries that will make it feverish. Accounting for this quickness by emphasizing various faults in the First City, this group addresses the "true" and "healthy" city claim secondarily, or else passes over it in silence. John Cooper, for example, acknowledges that "Glaucon will call it a 'city of pigs,' but Socrates insists it is the 'true' and 'healthy' one," but nevertheless restricts his focus to building an account for Socrates's quick concession to Glaucon:[14]

> When Glaucon scornfully dismisses Socrates' minimal first city as suited only for pigs, Socrates responds by expanding his city. . . . In doing this, he is recognizing the presence in human beings, and the power of, desires for pleasures of all sorts (the sort of desires Glaucon and Thrasymachus thought exhausted human motivation), alongside the basic Socratic desire for one's own good.[15]

Cooper's charge is that the psychological theory of motivation is underdeveloped in the description of the First City, that Glaucon recognizes this fault, and that Socrates concedes the point and moves forward with describing cities and citizens that are more psychologically plausible.[16] Cooper does not circle back around to account for Socrates's praise of the First City. He leaves it behind, as if it were an irrelevant side distraction from the main event.

Most critics of the First City locate its fault in a motivational shortcoming, similarly to Cooper's strategy. There is variation in what they point out as being the shortcoming, however. Julia Annas argues that the First City is flawed in its very foundation because the social glue that binds the citizens together is self-interest: "these people are motivated in their association entirely by self-interest, and this isn't the most glorious way of presenting ideal human nature."[17] In fact, she argues, there appears to be no motivational difference between the citizens of the First City and the citizens of the Luxurious City, since the latter "differs only

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[12]Barney, "Moral Nostalgia," 214.

[13]Rowe, "Key Passage," 59.

[14]Cooper, "Two Theories of Justice," 12.

[15]Cooper, "Two Theories of Justice," 14.

[16]Tad Brennan also thinks that the citizens of the First City are psychologically simple: "Because I am asking the psychogonic question, I treat the passage instead as an exploration of the question: what if humans only had one part? So there are no unsatisfied honor-lovers in the City of Pigs, because spirit has not yet been created" ("Spirited Part," 105).

[17]Annas, *Introduction*, 78.

in the type of needs satisfied." If the citizens of each of those cities have the same motivational profile, and the moral flaw in the Luxurious City is the motivational profile of its citizens, then the First City turns out to be no better than the other. She concludes that Plato "has not given the first city a clear place in the *Republic*'s moral argument," and that "the first city adds nothing, except a context in which the Principle of Specialization is introduced in a plausible way."[18]

Alternatively, Barney argues that Socrates rejects the First City not because it is defined by non-ideal motivations, but because it is psychologically, motivationally implausible: "The city is not a genuine possibility at all: for it embodies the hypothesis that a city without rational rule could be moderate in its appetites, and that hypothesis is false."[19] The criticism is that there just cannot be a city that has motivations like the ones we see in the First City. C. D. C. Reeve similarly charges that the First City is "not a real possibility" due to its lack of any mechanism for constraining the desires of its citizens: "It includes nothing to counteract the destabilizing effects of unnecessary appetites and the pleonexia to which they give rise."[20] Though Reeve is non-specific about whether the constraining force ought to be in the form of rational control or spirited enforcement (perhaps both), his point is that the city lacks sufficient counter-motivations to the "money-loving" desires that define its social arrangement.[21]

The critics of the First City tend to take Socrates's acquiescence to Glaucon's critique to be the final verdict on the goodness of that city. That is, because Socrates willingly leaves the First City behind, we should infer that it was not such a great city after all. With few exceptions, these critics do not return to Socrates's praise of the city in order to grapple with the seeming contradiction. Barney does pause over the ambiguity of the passage, explicitly prompting us to wonder "if the First City *is* true and healthy . . . how exactly is it insufficient?"[22] But she very quickly concludes that its goodness must consist simply in its embodiment of the Principle of Specialization "in which justice will turn out to consist."[23] Having set that problem aside, she focuses on accounting for Socrates's acquiescence. In instances where critics of the First City make any progress toward accounting for Socrates's praise of the First City, that accounting is quite thin.

On the other side of the debate, however, are those who prioritize the praise of the First City and leave the acquiescence as the afterthought. These commentators set Socrates's "true" and "healthy" city claim as the primary focal point and prioritize explaining Socrates's praise of the city. Having established a full account of the First City's virtues and whatever else merits its praise, this group only then addresses why Socrates acquiesces to Glaucon's criticism and, generally, in a way that preserves

[18]Annas, *Introduction*, 78–79.

[19]Barney, "Moral Nostalgia," 220n3.

[20]Reeve, *Philosopher-Kings*, 171.

[21]A third adherent of this criticism is Allan Bloom, who argues that the fault in the First City is in the *absence* of a particular motivation, namely, the motivation to engage in philosophy: "There could be no Socrates living there, both because it is not advanced enough to give him the basis for philosophic understanding and because such an idle, unproductive man would starve to death" ("Interpretive Essay," 347).

[22]Barney, "Moral Nostalgia," 214.

[23]Barney, "Moral Nostalgia," 214.

the virtue of the First City and depicts Socrates's acquiescence as a pedagogical move. The standard line of argument for this interpretation is that the First City is praised by Socrates because it realizes the Form of Justice. It counts as "true" and "healthy" in the strong normative sense, then, and Socrates's willingness to turn away from this city and take up the Luxurious City is a sign that he judges Glaucon to be not yet ready to grasp the Form of Justice as it is partaken in by the First City.

There are some disagreements among representatives of this reading, however. Some argue that the First City's realization of the Form of Justice, together with the fact that its constitution is significantly different from that of Kallipolis, means that Kallipolis is in fact *not* a just city. Rowe and Silverman are proponents of this interpretation, pointing to the fact that Kallipolis is the imperfect result of an attempt to "cure" the feverish Luxurious City.[24] The imperfection, these scholars argue, is a result of the philosopher rulers being limited in their capacity to wrangle in the excessive desires that Glaucon has insisted upon and that Socrates has conceded. If the philosopher rulers did succeed, Silverman and Rowe both argue, then Kallipolis would actually look like the First City. It would have no need of rulers and auxiliaries. However, "it cannot be completely cleansed or cured, and so actually become that first city; it will still be host to the 'luxuries' that make it 'feverish,' even if they are denied to the guards and rulers. To that extent it must always be a sick rather than a truly healthy city."[25] On this view, the First City is anchored as the just one, and the interpretation of the *Republic*, and of Socrates's concession to Glaucon in particular, is built out of what justice looks like in that *polis*.

Other scholars who champion the First City recognize justice in the First City, but equally recognize it in Kallipolis, too. On this reading, the Form of Justice floats free of the tripartite hierarchy that is definitive of Kallipolis. Instead, justice consists in "each doing their own work" and this social arrangement is realized in both the First City and Kallipolis.[26] Indeed, both cities are defined by this social arrangement, in their distinctive ways. The question that presses these commentators is why Socrates needs to develop Kallipolis at all if he already has a model of justice in a *polis* ready to hand. Jonas, Nakazawa, and Braun, and Smith agree here, too: Socrates has promised that we will be able to discern what justice is if it is writ large on the scale of a city. Glaucon reveals that the "letters" of the First City are still too small, and so Kallipolis must be developed for better seeing justice. As Jones, Nakazawa, and Braun note, "Unfortunately, after the interlocutors construct a city

[24]Rowe says that the Luxurious City is "in need of a cure" ("Key Passage," 58–59); and Silverman says that Plato's focus is on describing how "the fevered state can be purified" ("Ascent and Descent," 68).

[25]Rowe, "Key Passage," 60.

[26]Nicholas D. Smith puts the point in the following way: "Once justice is finally located and observed in the *Kallipolis*, Plato has Socrates repeatedly remind us that it is nothing other than the very same principle that was used in founding the first, most basic city, as well as each subsequent development worked upon that city, in transforming it into the *Kallipolis*: that each person in the city should do that and only that task in the city, for which his or her nature best suits them" ("Analogy of Soul and State," 43). And Jonas, Nakazawa, and Braun put the point as follows: "This interpretation is supported by the fact that the definition of justice that Socrates propounds at *Republic* 443b (and throughout the rest of *Republic* never rescinds or substantially modifies) can be read as the fundamental basis of the First City: namely, that each member of society will only do the job that they are naturally suited for, and in so doing will provide for the other inhabitants of the city" ("Appetite, Reason, and Education," 340).

that, as we shall argue, Socrates takes to embody justice (the First City), Glaucon is unable to see the justice of that city and demands a different type of city, namely a luxurious one with a fever. Consequently, in order for Socrates to fulfil his goal of the dialogue he must provide an image that better assists Glaucon in seeing justice."[27] Socrates's reason for acquiescing, then, is purely pedagogical.[28] Like the champions of the First City who argue that it alone is just—and that Kallipolis is an inevitably imperfect attempt to return to the First City—these commentators set the justice that they discern in the First City as an anchor for their interpretation of the *Republic*.

3. CONDITIONS FOR JUSTICE

The champions of the First City are my interlocutors in this paper. Their account of justice in the relatively simple (in relation to Kallipolis, anyway) city that is organized according to basic socio-economic principles is provocative. Theirs is the unorthodox reading, but it has in its favor the fact that it can make sense of Socrates's praise. Given that Socrates never revises his assessment of the First City as the "true" and "healthy" one, the sentiment haunts any interpretation of the *Republic* that establishes Kallipolis as singularly virtuous without any recall of that *polis* from which it originated.

Nevertheless, the unorthodox commentators protest too much. The First City is not a just city, much less is it better or more just than Kallipolis. In this section, I wage an argument to that effect. The conclusion of this argument aligns my reading with the critics of the First City, but whereas they locate the First City's fault in the psychological and motivational profile of the citizens, I argue that there are structural defects in the *polis* that prevent it, as described, from realizing the Form of Justice. There are three conditions or prerequisites that a city (or a soul, or anything else) must meet in order to be eligible for bearing the predicate 'justice.' I call these conditions (i) the Same Parts condition, (ii) the Ruling Part condition, and (iii) the Natural Fitness condition. These are not the conditions *of being just*, but conditions that differentiate the just-apt from just-inapt. Only entities that are just-apt—that is, the entities that meet these conditions—can be or become just. The First City is not such an entity. Let me explain each condition in turn.

3.1. The Same Parts Condition

Directly following his identification of the four cardinal virtues in Kallipolis and directly preceding his argument for the tripartition of the human soul, Socrates reiterates the pedagogical purpose of comparing cities with souls:

> Well, then, are things called by the same name, whether they are bigger or smaller than one another, like or unlike with respect to that to which that name applies?

[27]Jonas, Nakazawa, and Braun, "Appetite, Reason, and Education," 336.

[28]Smith, writing before Jonas, Nakazawa, and Braun, makes the same point, and emphasizes that 'better for seeing' is not equivalent to 'better overall': "Even if the *Kallipolis* provides a better image of Justice for the purposes of their investigation, however, as it plainly does, we should not necessarily suppose that the first city was either unjust or in any absolute way a poor or deeply flawed image of justice itself" ("Analogy of Soul and State," 42–43).

> Alike.
>
> Then a just man won't differ at all from a just city in respect to the form of justice; rather he'll be like the city.
>
> He will.
>
> But a city was thought to be just when each of the three natural classes within it did its own work, and it was thought to be moderate, courageous, and wise because of certain other conditions and states of theirs.
>
> That's true. Then, if an individual has these same parts [τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἴδη] in his soul, we will expect him to be correctly called by the same names as the city if he has the same conditions in them.
>
> Necessarily so.
>
> Then once again we've come upon an easy question, namely, does the soul have these three parts [τὰ τρία εἴδη ταῦτα] in it or not?[29]

Socrates explicitly states here that the city-soul analogy will succeed as a pedagogical tool for discovering the Form of Justice if and only if the city we have already examined and the soul we will consider equally satisfy a specific condition: they must have "the same three parts."

Now, it is true that the word translated as 'part' in the above passage is the Greek word εἴδη, which is better rendered as 'form' than as 'part.' Plato could have meant that we need to find "these same forms" in the soul, referring to the forms of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice that we defined and identified in Kallipolis only two Stephanus pages earlier. Indeed, we certainly would find that the soul is just in precisely the same way as the city if we find the very same forms of the virtues repeated in the soul. But, of course, this is a truism and not worth remarking, so it would be surprising if this were Plato's point. Further, the fact that the εἴδη are numbered at three (τρία) defeats the idea that the *four* virtues are the referents.

We might wish that Plato had used the less ambiguous—and less metaphysically loaded—μέρη to refer to the parts of the soul, but the fact of the matter is that he repeats that word εἴδη throughout the tripartition argument: "each of us has within himself the same parts [εἴδη] and characteristics as the city" (*Republic* 435d–e); "let these two parts [εἴδη] be distinguished in the soul" (*Republic* 439e); "is [spirit] also different from reason or a part [εἶδος] of it, so that there are not three, but two parts [εἴδη] in the soul?" (*Republic* 440e).[30] In order to make sense of Plato's use of the term across all of these passages, his enumeration of the εἴδη as three, and his insistence that they will be in some sense "the same" as what we saw in a city defined by a three-class hierarchy, we need to interpret him as saying that the possession of three psychic parts is a pre-condition for justice. Indeed, this is the most reasonable way of reading the conditional that isolates the lynchpin for the city-soul analogy: "If an individual has these same parts in his soul, we will

[29] *Republic* 435a–c.

[30] What is curious about his terminology is that he consistently uses the word γενή to refer to the three classes in the city, and this helps him to carefully demarcate city-parts from soul-parts, but the city-soul analogy hinges on there being the same three εἴδη in the soul that we had found in the city. Technically, only γενή had been found in the city, not εἴδη, but we get the point.

expect him to be correctly called by the same names as the city if he has the same conditions in those psychic parts."

The point of underscoring the Same Parts condition is not so much to emphasize the sameness of the parts, but the fact that only composites are eligible for being just. Insofar as partless entities are ineligible for being just, Socrates's First City comes under scrutiny. That city lacks the class divisions that we find in Kallipolis. Indeed, Kallipolis is *defined* by the class divisions and the hierarchy that emerges among its classes. The First City is notably (and, according to that city's champions, laudably) lacking in such classism.

Champions of the First City embrace the partlessness as a feature, not a flaw, of that *polis*. For example, Rowe explains that "the first city, so peremptorily dismissed by Glaucon—and by some modern interpreters—as fit only for pigs, offers a picture of a city, and by implication of a soul, that possesses the unity appropriate to a 'true' city and to the soul as it 'truly' is."[31] Lacking parts, the First City is maximally unified, to the point of consisting of a single part. Rowe reads this partlessness as a reason to judge the First City better than Kallipolis because, as he argues, the "true" soul is also partless: "In its true and essential nature neither city nor soul is divided into parts."[32] Rowe's idea is that the divisions that Plato identifies in Book IV emerge only in a soul that is sick—that is, a soul that is suffering conflicts due to lacking virtue.[33] That diseased, divided soul is the one that Socrates draws out by way of analogy with Kallipolis, Rowe points out, and this gives us reason to think that Kallipolis itself is riddled with sickness as well. That is, Kallipolis has parts precisely because it fails to realize full justice, and if it were to approximate justice more closely, it would look more like the First City. The partitioning of cities and souls is, for Rowe and Silverman, the setting in of disease.[34] The marker of health in the First City is precisely the fact that it lacks class divisions. However, if the Same Part condition is operative in Plato's conception of justice, then the disease-free, idyllic character of the First City may establish it as healthy, but it equally renders it ineligible for being just.[35]

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[31]Rowe, "Key Passage," 70.

[32]Rowe, "Key Passage," 55.

[33]Rowe cites a passage not from the *Republic*, but from the *Sophist* to illustrate this point: "This chimes with a passage in the *Sophist*, in which Socrates suggests that internal conflicts typically occur in souls of people that are 'in poor condition' (*phlauros echontes*). 'Well now,' he says, 'in a soul, when people are in poor condition, don't we observe beliefs disagreeing with desires, anger with pleasures, reason with pains, indeed all of these with each other'" ("Key passage," 66–67; cf. *Soph.* 228b).

[34]Silverman arrives at the same conclusion—that Kallipolis is exposed as being less than just by the fact that it has parts—and he does so via the same premise that disease or conflict has somehow got hold of the partitioned cities and souls of Book IV. But he goes one step farther than Rowe by arguing that it is the simple fact of being embodied that forces this disease upon the soul: "[The philosopher king] has to believe that he will not be able to make everyone a philosopher, given what he knows about the obstacles confronting humans in their incarnate existence. The best state he can reasonably hope for is the tripartite Kallipolis. It stands to the 'true city' (*Republic* II.372e), which is no city at all, as better to best. The philosopher's regret, then, is not the regret that he leaves behind contemplation, but that he cannot expect to achieve the truly fine goal of everyone being a philosopher" ("Ascent and Descent," 43).

[35]Smith argues that what he calls the '3–3 specification' in the city-soul analogy is in fact not what does the work to fill out the notion of justice that is realized in both cities and states. His argument hinges on the idea that the First City lacks parts and yet also displays justice: "Socrates' willingness to look for justice within this first city—which is not only expressed but then emphasized by his exhorting

3.2. *The Ruling Part Condition*

Following on the heels of the Same Parts condition is the further stipulation that a composite is eligible for being just if and only if one of its parts is capable of taking into consideration what is best for the whole and of exerting control over the other parts in the interest of realizing that good. Indeed, this condition appears to be implied by the Same Parts condition since a *ruling part* is one of the three parts that must be found in any composite that is virtue-apt. But whereas we placed emphasis on the *having of parts* in the Same Parts condition, with the Ruling Part condition we can emphasize the particular role of just one of those parts.

The ruling class in Kallipolis and the ruling part of the soul are necessary to establishing their respective composites as eligible for becoming just in two specific ways: (i) in the formal cause of justice and (ii) in the efficient cause of justice. The account for (i) can be seen partially in the Same Parts condition. What it is to be just—that is, what it is the participate in the Form of Justice—is to have three parts, those parts being the "same" as the parts of Kallipolis, and that means that one part is capable of ruling the others. Plato does put special emphasis on the ruling part over and beyond the other parts, though. He demonstrates that he believes this part does much of the heavy lifting in filling out the Form of Justice. When he specifies that the parts are distinguished according to the work and motivational profiles that belong to them, and then goes on to identify what precisely that work and motivational profile is for each, he reveals that the lower parts are defined in reference to the ruling part. He makes this point explicitly in reference to the auxiliaries:

> Then, isn't it truly most correct to call these people complete guardians, since they will guard against external enemies and internal friends, so that the one will lack the power and other the desire to harm the city? The young people we've hitherto called guardians we'll now call *auxiliaries* and supporters of the guardians' convictions.[36]

We cannot conceive of what the auxiliaries are without reference to the ruling class. They are defined by the relation. They are even named according to the relation. Without the ruling part, there is not an auxiliary part. Hence, the Ruling Part condition follows of necessity from the specification that justice is "each part doing its own work and not meddling in the work of another" and the Same Parts condition.

But Plato also indicates it is the ruling part that effects justice in a composite—this is (ii), enumerated above. The ruling part carries out its role as efficient cause through complex educational and punitive interactions with the other parts. We see a concise idealization of this role in the famous "Myth of Metals" or "Noble Lie" passage of Book III:

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the reluctant and puzzled Adeimantus and then by his remarkably positive final appraisal, to Glaucon—would be inexplicable if Plato wished to show us that justice in a city had to be understood in terms of the proper functioning of three classes within a city" ("Analogy of Soul and State," 39). The mistake here is that Socrates does *not* promise that we can discern the Form of Justice in the First City. Instead, he says we can discern the *origins* of justice there. I address this issue in the final section of this paper.

[36] *Republic* 414b. A few Stephanus pages later, he makes an amendment to their job specification: "We'll give our guardians this further order, namely, to guard in every way against the city's being either small or great in reputation instead of being sufficient in size and one in number" (*Republic* 423c).

> Aren't these reasons, Glaucon, that education in music and poetry is most important? First, because rhythm and harmony permeate the inner part of the soul more than anything else, affecting it most strongly and bringing it grace, so that if someone is properly educated in music and poetry, it makes him graceful, but if not, then the opposite. Second, because anyone who has been properly educated in music and poetry will sense it acutely when something has been omitted from a thing and when it hasn't been finely crafted or finely made by nature.[37]

The designers and implementers of the grand educational program of Kallipolis are the members of that city's ruling class. The exercise of force can be seen in the way that the city's rulers employ the auxiliaries for the purpose of "[guarding] against external enemies and internal friends, so that the one will lack the power and the other the desire to harm the city."[38] Through conditioning the other parts to perform their own work and utilizing available means for policing the activities of the other parts, the ruling part actually creates justice in its composite.

Notice that this efficient causation is distinct from the formal causation by which the ruling part causes its composite to be wise. A city and a soul each "would be wise because of the smallest class and part in it, namely, the governing or ruling one."[39] What it is for the ruling part to cause wisdom is simply for it to be wise, but what it is for it to cause justice is for it to condition and police the other parts.

It may seem that this argument lacks force in light of the possibility of an *external* ruling part doing the work of conditioning and policing all of the parts in a composite. If justice requires only that each part do its own work and not meddle, then it seems plausible that this organization could be brought about by external forces and then stabilized by the fact that one of those parts—the ruling one—will have the work of maintaining order. Indeed, Plato may be gesturing to an account like that when he indicates with the Myth of Metals that the myth "would, in the best case, persuade even the rulers."[40] He might imagine that social engineers or moral educators, external to the framework of the *polis*, are required for organizing the city (or the soul) to get it operating correctly, and in that case the initial efficient cause is external to the composite.

Such a reading is undermined by an unambiguous statement from Socrates at the beginning of Book IV: "If the guardians of our laws and city are merely believed to be guardians but are not, you surely see that they'll destroy the city utterly, just as *they alone have the opportunity to govern it well and make it happy*."[41] The rulers are the efficient cause of the city's goodness and flourishing in general, and its justice in particular (which is what its flourishing consists in). But, furthermore, Socrates is also uncompromising in his thought that the justice of the composite must be maintained by an *internal* organizational principle. Lacking internal rule, the composite's virtue will not be "genuine and stable," to borrow a phrase from Rachana Kamtekar.[42] As a result, the Ruling Part condition must be met in order

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[37] *Republic* 401d–e.

[38] *Republic* 414b.

[39] *Republic* 428e.

[40] *Republic* 414c.

[41] *Republic* 421a, emphasis added.

[42] Kamtekar, "Imperfect Virtue," 316. Catherine McKeen raises a similar point, arguing that the defect in the First City is that its unity (which is its virtue—hence, she believes that the city does not

that a composite—whether city, soul, or *x*—both may become just in the first place, but then reliably go on being just once it has become so. The ruling part's work in effecting justice does not end.

This presents a problem for champions of the First City. Because they emphasize the partlessness of the First City, they cannot account for a ruling part.[43] In fact, Silverman goes so far as to say that the lack of rule (anarchy) is the good-making feature of the *polis*:

> It follows that the ideal circumstance is one in which everyone is a philosopher. While we might describe such an outcome as a community of philosophers, such a circumstance is one in which there is no need of rulers, for each can rule him- or herself. The state evaporates. Plato, then, is committed to philosophical anarchy, the condition in which each soul rules itself. Philosophical anarchy is the ideal nonpolitical condition sought by reason.[44]

Likewise, Rowe insists that the ruling and auxiliary classes are created only as a remedy for the sickness that is overwhelming the feverish city. "It must always be a sick rather than a truly healthy city. But that is why it needs guards, and rulers—and especially philosophical rulers, insofar as it is philosophy that will provide the insight required for the maintenance of the city's institutions: the maintenance, above all, of its educational system, which produces guards immune to the allure of gold, silver, and the rest, so rendering them saviours both of themselves and of the city."[45] Both Rowe and Silverman agree that a ruling part is unnecessary in a just city and is, in fact, a sign that a city is deficient. Thus, the champions of the First City appear to have rejected Plato's Ruling Part condition on the grounds that it is a condition of *qualified* justice, the approximation of justice that is achievable in entities that have grown sick and partitioned.

But even were we to grant, contra Rowe and Silverman and others insisting that the First City is definitively partless, that there are "parts" in the First City—perhaps if each citizen who produces a distinct good is counted as a distinct part—it would nevertheless be impossible to identify one of those parts as the distinctive ruler of the whole. The First City, even with this artificial concession of parts, is no more eligible for becoming just than a clock. In the same way that a clock fails to be eligible for becoming just on account of it not having any internal mechanism that intelligently rules over the whole (formal cause) or that once established and now maintains the organization of the whole (efficient cause), so too the First City is ineligible because it lacks a part that can fulfil these roles.

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meet the Same Parts condition) inheres as a result of chance rather than as a result of purposeful organization: "There is no mechanism in the *huopolis* to guard against changing fortunes, accidents and circumstances which would lead individual interests to diverge. To the extent that the *huopolis* depends on luck, it is unstable and insufficiently unified, and thus, is inferior to the *kallipolis*" ("Swillsburg City Limits," 71). It is the risk of destabilization that worries McKeen, but her argument is ultimately more consequentialist than mine. I emphasize that there must be something playing the organizational role in order to fulfill the formal definition of justice, while she emphasizes that the good outcomes are realized only when something plays that role.

[43]The critics of the First City, we saw, largely agreed that the fact that the First City lacked rational rule is its most basic fault. Their emphasis is on the *rational* aspect—the fact that there is not a rational force in the *polis*, or the fact that there is no rational desire at all. My criticism is different because it focuses not on the rationality of the rule, but on *the rule* itself.

[44]Silverman, "Ascent and Descent," 63.

[45]Rowe, "Key Passage," 60.

The argumentative move by which we can establish clocks as ineligible for being just is through the Ruling Part condition. That condition explains why a thing of parts—that is, a composite—can fail to be just *even though* "each part does its own work and does not meddle in the work of others."[46] The explanatory power of the condition forces us to concede that the First City, even if it were to meet the Same Parts condition by having distinct parts within it, is no more just than any other ruler-less composite.

3.3. The Natural Fitness Condition

The final condition that a composite must meet in order for it to be eligible for being just can be teased out of the strict definition of justice itself:

> $\text{Justice}_{\text{def}}$: each part does their own work and does not meddle in the work of another.

This definition requires that a particular work genuinely belong to the part expected to perform it. Without any robust connection between a part and its work, justice would consist in an arbitrary arrangement. Plato least of all believes that justice is an arbitrary arrangement, so he establishes a robust connection between a part and its work by emphasizing that each part in a just composite must do the particular work for which it is "naturally best suited."[47] It must be the case, then, that each part has some such work for which it is so suited. As such, Plato is committed to the Natural Fitness condition that requires that the parts in a composite each have a distinctive work that belongs to them in a way that is non-arbitrary and, indeed, counts as "natural."

Prima facie, it looks as if the First City meets the Natural Fitness condition because it is organized according to the Principle of Specialization. That socio-economic principle states that each citizen performs their own work and leaves other work alone. It is an idea that Plato puts into Socrates's mouth as a theory of how to maximize quantity and quality in the production of goods:

> More plentiful and better-quality goods are more easily produced if each person does one thing for which he is naturally suited, does it at the right time, and is released from having to do any of the others.[48]

This passage, which occurs in the course of establishing the parameters that define the First City, clearly states that the citizens of that *polis* will perform work to which they are "naturally suited." Because each citizen in the First City does this, the city is able to enjoy, albeit moderately, a steady supply of goods that meet all of their basic needs, with salt and garnishes added for modest pleasure.

The difficulty with reading the First City as meeting the Natural Fitness condition in this way is that there is in fact no mechanism in that *polis* for ensuring that the work taken up by each citizen is the work that they are naturally fit for

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[46]This is also why Barnes misses the target in his criticism of Plato's conception of justice: "We can jettison the stuff and nonsense and consider the abstract proposition that Jill and Jack will be just provided that each of their principal constituent parts (whatever they may be) does what it ought to be doing" ("Justice Writ Large," 48). Plato is quite careful in specifying what the parts must be—that is, he is careful to specify that one of the parts must be capable of ruling the whole.

[47]*Republic* 433a.

[48]*Republic* 370c.

in the requisite sense. It is true that Socrates suggests they are "naturally suited" to their work, but that work is not deeply enough "their own." Rather than sorting citizens into occupations according to deep, character defining aptitudes as we see done in Kallipolis, the Principle of Specialization as it is described in the First City appears to operate, at best, according to superficial markers of comparative advantage. The retailers are those "whose bodies are weakest and who aren't fit to do any other work" and wage earners are those "whose minds alone wouldn't qualify them for membership in our society but whose bodies are strong enough for labor."[49] While these distinguishing markers do presage some of the class distinctions of Kallipolis, they are far thinner and much more superficial than the differences that mark producers, auxiliaries, and philosophers apart. For one thing, the differences between citizens in the First City are primarily bodily differences, but between citizens of Kallipolis, they are psychic. "Natural fitness" for a particular work in the Kallipolis is a matter of being psychically determined to perform a task. It is essential to a citizen that they will fail in any other work. But in the First City, it is only an accident (of body or of circumstance) that renders one person better prepared to perform a particular work. Hence, it is a thin notion of comparative advantage that fills out the meaning of 'naturally suited' in the description of the First City.[50]

Notice, also, that the kinds of work that are taken up by the citizens of the First City are precisely the kinds that, in Kallipolis, do not need to be regulated. Jobs in the First City have to do with the production of material goods. These are the jobs of producers in Kallipolis, and Plato tells us that the philosopher rulers do not need to worry themselves about managing the activities of the producers.

> If a carpenter attempts to do the work of a cobbler, or a cobbler that of a carpenter, or they exchange their tools or honors with one another, or if the same person tries to do both jobs, and all other such exchanges are made, do you think that does any great harm to the city?
>
> Not much.[51]

Or, even if these workers do need to be regulated, it is not for the purpose of maintaining the city's justice. What matters is that the producers, as a collective, produce the goods that the city needs to consume. The strict adherence to "their work" and avoidance of meddling *within* their class—for instance, to cobbling

[49] *Republic* 371d–e.

[50] Annas implies that she thinks the notion of "their own" is thick in the Principle of Specialization: "Socrates claims that the specialization of labour is *natural;* at any rate he supports it by claiming (370b) that 'each one of us is born somewhat different from the others, one more apt for one task, one for another' (Grube). The Principle of Specialization turns out to be basic for the structure of Plato's own ideally just state, and so it is important for him to show that it answers to what is found in nature and is not merely a conventional way of arranging matters; if it were, then the justice found in the ideal state would have no better claim to be what justice really is than what Thrasymachus suggests" (*Introduction*, 74). But focusing only on the notion of what is "natural" is insufficient for distinguishing *bodily* natural differences from *psychic* natural differences, and focusing only on the places where Socrates uses the term "natural" distracts from the passages where he spells out what the differences are between the citizens, i.e. bodily differences.

[51] *Republic* 434a. See also *Republic* 425c–e, where Socrates and his interlocutors agree that "market business" does not need to be regulated because "it isn't appropriate to dictate to men who are fine and good. They'll easily find out for themselves whatever needs to be legislated about such things."

rather than carpentry—does not contribute to making the city just.[52] When we consider the First City, then, we should not think that it is a just *polis* on account of its citizens performing the work that they have a thin comparative advantage in performing. The producers in Kallipolis likely have a thin comparative advantage in performing their work, too, but even if it is thicker, Plato still does not want to regulate it, because inefficiencies in production do not amount to injustice.

The champions of the First City have formed their argument in a way that lends credence to this view. They agree with one another that rational, spirited, and appetitive motivations are blended seamlessly in the First City, with each citizen displaying a harmonious balance of such desires. Rowe puts this point explicitly in terms of psychic activity, drawing the conclusion that the psychic profiles of the citizens of the First City are completely unified.[53] None can be said to be dominated by any particular motivational drive, then, and so there is no way of distinguishing the citizens according to deep natural aptitudes. If they turn out to have different aptitudes at all, those differences arise accidentally.[54]

If Plato is earnest in loading the definition of justice with a meaning of "their own" that is filled out by his notion of "natural suitedness," then the only cities that are eligible for becoming just are those cities where citizens (i) have distinct natural aptitudes that reflect their essential psychic conditions and (ii) are sorted into work according to those distinctions. The citizens of the First City meet neither of these criteria, therefore the First City is not a just city, nor even eligible for being just. However, if Plato does not intend a robust, essentialist meaning of "their own," then the First City's failure in meeting (i) and (ii) matters not at all for its eligibility for becoming just. What matters is only that each citizen of that *polis* performs "their own" work—on whatever sense of "their own" is meant.

There is a significant drawback to draining the meaning of "their own" in this way, however. It renders unintelligible all of the emphasis that Plato lays on natural fitness, on breeding programs, and on the rarity of philosophical natures.[55] If deep,

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[52]This may very well be because the producers are assigned to their tasks according to the thin notion of comparative advantage that is operative in the First City.

[53]"The citizens of the first city, too, will think, get angry, be thirsty, and so on, and no doubt it will be appropriate to think of these as distinct soul-functions, but insofar as those functions will never be in conflict (given that the soul in each case is as unified as the city is), there will be every reason to think of them as being performed 'with the same thing' rather than 'with three things [or elements], one for each'; it is 'the whole soul' that acts in each case" (Rowe, "Key Passage," 66).

[54]On the question of whether or not there are different aptitudes among the citizens of the First City, the passages where Socrates says that their physical differences account for them being better prepared for one work or another seems evidence enough that the answer is "yes." However, Silverman believes that each and every citizen of the First City is in fact a philosopher and that this circumstance is what makes the First City "best": "[The philosopher ruler] has to believe that he will not be able to make everyone a philosopher, given what he knows about the obstacles confronting humans in their incarnate existence. The best state he can reasonably hope for is the tripartite Kallipolis. It stands to the 'true city' (*Republic* II.372e), which is no city at all, as better to best. The philosopher's regret, then, is not the regret that he leaves behind contemplation, but that he cannot expect to achieve the truly fine goal of everyone being a philosopher" ("Ascent and Descent," 43). Accordingly, he must think that they all have the same aptitudes, or at a minimum he must think they all have the same deep, essential aptitudes, and perhaps this is compatible with some superficial differences in physical aptitudes.

[55]For example, at *Republic* 474b–c, that people with the nature definitive of philosophers are "fitted by nature both to engage in philosophy and to rule in a city, while the rest are naturally fitted to leave philosophy alone and follow their leader."

essential aptitude is not what determines a citizen's work to be "their own," then the citizens of Kallipolis could be assigned to their work according to arbitrary, accidental differences and the rulers would not need to obsess over the sex lottery and sorting of classes. Needless to say, a reading of the *Republic* that requires us to set aside all of these features of the discussion is a very unattractive one. For this reason, the Natural Fitness condition is reinforced as a requirement for becoming just, and the First City—not meeting this condition—is shown to be ineligible.

4. THE ORIGINS OF JUSTICE

The above discussion serves two purposes: (i) to undermine an unorthodox reading of the *Republic* that is offered by champions of the First City and (ii) to consider in full view the requirements that Plato establishes for justice, beyond the bare statement that justice is "doing one's own and not meddling in the work of another." Essentially, the unorthodox reading charges that the First City that Socrates describes in Book II, in a series of city-descriptions that culminates in the description of Kallipolis, is in fact a just city. Some go so far as to say that the First City alone is just, that Kallipolis is *not* just, and so the First City is better than Kallipolis. If the above consideration of the three conditions for justice is correct, however, and the First City does indeed fail to meet each condition, then that *polis* cannot be counted just. On my analysis, it cannot be counted even eligible for becoming just. This is because it is not a composite (the Same Parts condition), it lacks an intelligent internal organizational principle (the Ruling Part condition), and its citizens are assigned work according to a thin notion of comparative advantage rather than deep, essential features of their psychic profiles (the Natural Fitness condition). In all, these three conditions militate in favor of reading Kallipolis alone as the just city.

Nevertheless, I must avoid falling into the trap that so many of the orthodox critics of the First City fall into: accounting for the faults of the First City without accounting for Socrates's praise of it and its role in the overall argument of the *Republic*. Here, then, I want to address this problem.

Let me say upfront that I agree with Julia Annas's assessment that the description of the First City functions as an opportunity for Socrates to present the Principle of Specialization.[56] Of course, Annas states that the city "adds nothing" beyond this opportunity, which is likely overstating the case, given that Socrates identifies that *polis* as "true" and "healthy." Nevertheless, the centrality of the Principle of Specialization to determining the socio-economic organization of the First City indicates that we are meant to be considering the dynamics and implications of that principle when we hold up the First City for consideration. It seems that we must account for the argumentative function of the First City and what its being "true" and "healthy" consists in, by examining the Principle of Specialization itself.

Many scholars have equated the Principle of Specialization with the definition of justice that we learn in Book IV. Annas says, "The Principle of Specialization turns out to be basic for the structure of Plato's own ideally just state."[57] Barney declares

[56]Annas, *Introduction*, 78–79.
[57]Annas, *Introduction*, 74.

that the First City "embodies the principle of specialization in which justice will turn out to consist."[58] Rowe states that "we should notice that while Callipolis looks, and is, very different from Socrates's first city, it also shares with it what is—from the perspective of the overall argument of Books II–IV, and of its main purpose of providing an account of justice—the single most important feature of all. The justice of Callipolis will turn out to be a matter of 'each single individual's doing the job that is his, and not meddling in what should be done by others.'"[59] And Silverman argues that "When the inhabitants of the city understand how to satisfy their minimal needs, they need not interfere with one another; rather, each does his own thing, minding his own affairs (*Republic* II.370a). This is, of course, the definition of justice from Book IV."[60] Critics and champions of the First City agree on this point, then: that the organizational principle of the First City is Plato's account of justice itself.

Smith, as a champion of the First City, draws out the implications of this view:

> Once justice is finally located and observed in the *Kallipolis*, Plato has Socrates repeatedly remind us that it is nothing other than the very same principle that was used in founding the first, most basic city, as well as each subsequent development worked upon that city, in transforming it into the *Kallipolis*: that each person in the city should do that and only that task in the city, for which his or her nature best suits them (see 370a7–b2, 374a4–e8, 432d7–433a6, 443b7–c7). Accordingly, it turns out that there was justice in the first and most basic city, which now presumably even Glaucon and Adeimantus are in a position to see: in that city, no less than in the *Kallipolis*, each person did that for which they were best suited by nature, and did not meddle in what others were better suited to do.[61]

Not only is there general consensus that the Principle of Specialization is the formula at the heart of the definition of justice, but some conclude from this interpretation that the First City itself is just precisely because it embodies the principle.

But Socrates does not actually say that we see *justice* in the First City. He says that we can discern the *origins* of justice and injustice in the First City. When Glaucon raises his objection that Socrates looks to be "founding a city of pigs" by providing such austere living conditions for the citizens of the First City, Socrates responds by adding some luxuries, but clarifying that they are now describing a different city all together:

> I understand. It isn't merely the origin of a city that we are considering, it seems, but the origin of a *luxurious* city. And that may not be a bad idea, for by examining it, we might very well see how justice and injustice grow up in cities. Yet the true city, in my opinion, is the one we've described, the healthy one, as it were. But let's study a city with a fever, if that's what you want. There's nothing to stop us.[62]

> εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ: μανθάνω. οὐ πόλιν, ὡς ἔοικε, σκοποῦμεν μόνον ὅπως γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρυφῶσαν πόλιν. ἴσως οὖν οὐδὲ κακῶς ἔχει: σκοποῦντες γὰρ καὶ τοιαύτην τάχ' ἂν κατίδοιμεν τήν τε δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐμφύονται. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀληθινὴ πόλις

[58]Barney, "Moral Nostalgia," 214.
[59]Rowe, "Key Passage," 61.
[60]Silverman, "Ascent and Descent," 69.
[61]Smith, "Analogy of Soul and State," 43, quoted earlier in n. 25.
[62]*Republic* 372e.

> δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἣν διεληλύθαμεν, ὥσπερ ὑγιής τις: εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε, καὶ φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν: οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει.

The relevant phrase—σκοποῦντες γὰρ καὶ τοιαύτην τάχ' ἂν κατίδοιμεν τήν τε δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐμφύονται—may be translated literally as "for also by looking at such a city as this, we may discern both justice and injustice, in what way they are implanted in cities."[63] There is little indication that Socrates means for us to interpret this as suggesting that we will see the Form of Justice itself in either the First City or the Luxurious City. Rather, we will observe conditions or mechanisms or principles that are necessary for justice (and injustice!) to be implemented. The scholarly discussion of the First City has paid far too little attention to this point.

In what way can we discern justice being "implanted" or "taking root" (ἐμφύονται) in the First City, then? I submit that Plato uses that word to convey that the Form of Justice is in an embryonic form in the First City. This is because the Principle of Specialization, which is the organizational principle of that *polis*, captures some—*but not all*—of the features of justice.[64] The Principle of Specialization is as follows:

> Principle of Specialization$_{def}$: each does their own work and does not meddle in the work of another

As discussed in section 3, the First City does indeed manifest this principle, but the city's perfect realization of the principle is precisely what reveals the gap between the principle and the Form of Justice. Because the citizens of the First City perform work that is "their own" only in a very thin sense, too thin to meet the Natural Fitness condition, it is clear that the notion of "their own" that is operative in the Principle of Specialization is too thin to be a match for the thicker notion in the definition of justice. We will recall the definition of justice that we earlier established:

> Justice$_{def}$: each part does their own work and does not meddle in the work of another

Though the definition of the Principle of Specialization and the definition of justice each feature the phrase 'their own,' the meaning of that phrase in the

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[63]Rowe, "Key Passage," 58n7, provides an excellent survey of how translators have rendered the relevant phrase. I agree with Rowe that we should read the first καὶ in this key phrase as meaning that the Luxurious City will provide *another* or *additional* or *alternative* opportunity to discern justice and injustice being implanted in a city. That is, Socrates is saying that examination of the First City provided ample opportunity to consider the origins of justice, but the Luxurious City *also* provides that opportunity, so there is no reason to hesitate in following Glaucon to that city. I read the passage differently from Rowe in that he takes the language of ἐμφύονται (which he translates as "take root") to indicate that justice can be found in its full form in the First City, but I read Socrates as saying that we will see it only in embryonic form there.

[64]This may be the reasoning of Merriman, who gives the name 'Rudimentary City' to the First City and says that the division of labor in that *polis* is "a rudimentary justice." Merriman implies that the 'Rudimentary City' intended primarily to be a "rudimentary" example of temperance, though: "The economic environment imposes on the inhabitants the temperance of individuals; they are hardy vegetarians. But they possess this virtue in a rudimentary and negative form; their wants are few not because their appetites are under control, but because no appetites have yet arisen. When appetites do arise, they plunge into self-indulgence and have to learn self-discipline. They then become truly temperate as individuals" ("Rise and Fall," 9). Despite supplying this explanation of how the rudimentary temperance of the First City's citizens falls short of full temperance, Merriman does not explain how its rudimentary justice falls short. The idea is asserted without argument.

latter definition is much more developed and robust than in the former. Thus, even though we can see explicit replication of phrasing between the statement of the Principle of Specialization and the definition of justice, the former is a lesser developed version of the latter.

But, further, notice that the definition of justice features an additional word—'part.' This reflects Plato's reliance on the Same Parts condition. He does not merely think that an empty "each" should perform their work, but that each *part* should do so. He underscores this idea when he tells us that it matters very little to Kallipolis's justice whether or not the members of the producer class avoid meddling in one another's work. What matters, he says, is that they avoid meddling in the work of the other classes—that is, the other *parts*—of the city. The addition of this one word in the definition of justice represents a significant modification on the formulation of the Principle of Specialization. Just as the Natural Fitness condition forces a modification by shifting the meaning of "their own" from a thin to a thick notion, so too the Same Parts condition forces a modification by specifying who or what the relevant "each" are. Again, this reveals that the definition of justice is a more advanced version of the principle.

In order to reflect the way that the third condition—the Ruling Part condition—further refines the principle, we might make one last modification to our definition of justice:

> Justice$_{\text{def}}$: each part does their own work and does not meddle in the work of another, *and one of those parts rules the whole.*

Or:

> Justice$_{\text{def}}$: each part *in an internally ruled composite* does their own work and does not meddle in the work of another.

Both of these alternatives may seem overly strong. They represent an effort to add language that Plato has not used rather than reinterpreting the language that is there. Nevertheless, his emphasis on wisdom and philosopher rulers as necessary elements of just souls and states, respectively, encourages us to explore options like these. Lest we forget the Ruling Part condition, we should perhaps incorporate it into the definition of justice, as we understand it from the *Republic*.

Based on the understanding of how the three conditions contribute to modifying the Principle of Specialization in order to deliver a definition of justice, we can make sense of why Socrates claimed that we can discern the origins of justice in the First City. It is because justice is the Principle of Specialization augmented by these other conditions. The organizational principle that defines the First City is an embryonic concept that grows into the definition of justice.

This reading illuminates Socrates's meaning when he says that the Principle of Specialization is "a sort of image of justice."

> Indeed, Glaucon, the principle that it is right for someone who is by nature a cobbler to practice cobblery and nothing else, for the carpenter to practice carpentry, and the same for the others is a sort of image of justice [εἴδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης]—that's why it's beneficial [δι' ὃ καὶ ὠφελεῖ].
>
> Apparently.

> And in truth justice is, it seems, something of this sort [τοιοῦτόν τι ἦν]. However, it isn't concerned with someone's doing his own externally, but with what is inside him, with what is truly himself and his own. One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of another part or allow the various classes within him to meddle with each other. He regulates what is really his own and rules himself. He puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of himself like three limiting notes in a musical scale.[65]

Justice is "something like" the Principle of Specialization. The principle itself is "a sort of image of justice." Socrates feigns shock and surprise at this convenient line up of concepts, saying that "with the help of some god, we had hit upon the origin and pattern [εἰς ἀρχήν τε καὶ τύπον τινὰ] of justice right at the beginning [εὐθὺς ἀρχόμενοι] in founding our city."[66] This reference back to the Book II discussion where Socrates had initially began describing *poleis* with a view to identifying the Form of Justice in "large letters," demonstrates that he takes the Principle of Specialization to be the beginning or *origin* of justice.[67] Indeed, even the First City itself, being organized explicitly and exclusively according to the Principle of Specialization, counts as a pattern of justice.

"That's why it's beneficial," Socrates tells us. The Principle of Specialization, as well as the First City that instantiates it, is a helpful guide on the way to discovering justice. In the same way that mathematical study trains the soul to look upwards, in the direction of the Form of the Good, this εἴδωλόν of justice has prepared us for grasping the very essence of the concept itself.[68] But that pattern is only "a sort of image." It should not be mistaken for the Form.

What remains is to account for Socrates's praise of the First City. If that *polis* does not realize the Form of Justice and if it is, in fact, ineligible for becoming just, as I have argued here, then what does Socrates have in mind when he says it is "true" and "healthy"? Let us visit Socrates's words when he makes this claim:

> ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀληθινὴ πόλις δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἣν διεληλύθαμεν, ὥσπερ ὑγιής τις.

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[65] *Republic* 443c–d.

[66] *Republic* 443b–c.

[67] Reeve, in his revision of Grube's translation of the dialogue, footnotes this passage with a reference back to 432c–433b in Book IV. There, Socrates says, "What we are looking for seems to have been rolling around at our feet from the very beginning, and we didn't see it, which was ridiculous of us. Just as people sometimes search for the very thing they are holding in their hands, so we didn't look in the right direction but gazed off into the distance, and that's probably why we didn't notice it. . . . Justice, I think, is exactly what we said must be established throughout the city when we were founding it—either that *or some form of it* [τούτου τι εἶδος]. We stated, and often repeated, if you remember, that everyone must practice one of the occupations in the city for which he is naturally best suited" (*Republic* 432d–433a, emphasis added). Reeve is right to point us back to this passage, but this passage points us back even farther—to the "beginning" when the Principle of Specialization was first established (*Republic* 369).

[68] See the Book VII discussion of the philosophers' education, e.g. the progression of mathematical study, through harmonics and dialectic, is a "release from bonds and turning around from shadows to statues and the light of the fire and, then, the way up out of the cave to the sunlight and, there, the continuing inability to look at the animals, the plants, and the light of the sun, but the newly acquired ability to look at divine images [*phantasmata*] in water and shadows of the things that are [*tōn ontōn*], rather than, as before, merely at shadows of statues thrown by another sources of light that is itself a shadow in relation to the sun—all this business of the crafts we've mentioned has the power to awaken the best part of the soul and lead it upward to the study of the best among the things that are" (*Republic* 532b–c).

He says that the *polis* we have just examined (the First City) seems to him (δοκεῖ) to be the "true" one (ἀληθινὴ), and then he uses an adverb (ὥσπερ) to introduce a clause that clarifies the sense of "true" that he intends: "as if it were a healthy one" or "like a healthy one." Altogether, "the true city, in my opinion, is the one which we've described, the healthy one, as it were." The First City is "true" precisely in the sense that it is "healthy." We need to understand why Socrates wants to emphasize its healthiness, then.

A simple and straightforward explanation comes from the fact that the organizational principle of the First City is "a sort of image of justice." Though an image is not the real deal, it may nevertheless confer a healthy status upon the *polis*. What does that health consist in, though? Context is a clue here. Socrates has realized the nature of Glaucon's objection, and he is explaining the implications of following Glaucon's line of thought. Socrates wants to impress upon Glaucon that they will not merely be growing the First City if they add the comforts that Glaucon wishes to add. They will be imagining a completely new constitution. A *polis* that is complete unto itself, self-sufficient, and stable, will be put to one side, and a distinct city (one that is not complete, nor self-sufficient, nor stable) will be considered instead. Socrates emphasizes this contrast twice: (i) "the origin of a city" versus "the origin of a luxurious city" and (ii) "healthy" versus "feverish."

Socrates neither says, nor intends to imply, that the First City is "healthy" in the way that just souls and just cities are "healthy." He means something much more modest: that the First City contrasts with the Luxurious City, similarly to how health contrasts with fever, because it is a simple, self-contained *polis* while the latter is grasping and insatiate. Hence, the First City is counted "true" because it is healthy, and it is counted "healthy" because it is self-contained and simple. This reinforces the assessment Socrates made several lines earlier, when he sought Adeimantus's agreement that the First City was "grown [ηὔξηται] to completeness [τελέα]."[69] In issuing that judgment, Socrates was referring to nothing other than the First City's self-sufficiency in providing plentiful, albeit moderate, goods for itself, which is accomplished—of course—through its instantiation of the Principle of Specialization. Ultimately, then, the health of the First City arises from the principle.

5. CONCLUSION

The aims of this paper have been two-fold: (i) to account for the role of Socrates's First City in the overall argument of the *Republic* through engagement with the arguments of those who defend that *polis* as the truly just one, and (ii) to draw out all facets of justice as it is defined in Book IV. These aims are intertwined in this discussion, each inquiry aiding the other. This is how Plato always intended the *Republic* to be read.

The results of the first inquiry are plain enough. The First City is not the truly just *polis*. That city counts as "true" and "healthy" due to its being organized according to a principle that is itself an "image of justice." We glimpse an "origin" or "pattern" of justice in the City of Pigs, but we do not find that *polis* participating in the Form

[69] *Republic* 371e.

of the Justice itself. Champions of the First City have correctly discerned some good in that city, then, since Plato does conceive of a connection between the image and the Form. But the champions mistake the likeness for the thing itself.

Setting the image next to the account that is unfurled in Book IV reveals the ways in which the image fails to realize all aspects of the Form. This inquiry, the second of the two that constitute this paper, is the more important focus of this discussion. I have argued that Plato established three conditions for justice—the Same Parts condition, the Ruling Part condition, and the Natural Fitness condition—and each of these conditions must be met by any composite that is to be eligible for being either just or unjust. In appreciating the role of these conditions, we are able to better see the Form of Justice itself and also to differentiate it from its likenesses. What we learn is that justice is each part in an internally ruled composite doing their own work and not meddling in the work of another.[70]

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